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DE MOCRACY, SOVEREIGNTY AND TAX COMPETITION: THE ROLE OF TAX 






 Virtually all efforts to confront and curb tax competition effectively require some 
measure of cooperation among nation-states.  Regardless of the precise amount and type 
of competition deemed acceptable, the cooperation question arises.  Only for those who 
would advocate a complete acceptance of all forms of “tax competition” would 
cooperation seem irrelevant, although even for those pro-competition advocates, some 
joint advocacy on the part of the “competing” nations has formed an important part of 
their efforts to maintain competitive practices.1  Assuming we envision a world in which 
there is some notable commitment by a number of nations to tackle the problem of 
“harmful” tax competition, what will their solution look like?  The prospect of tax 
cooperation inevitably raises questions regarding the plausibility of such cooperation, the 
scope and best context for such cooperation and the normative principles upon which it 
rests.  Yet attempting to resolve these broad questions can be daunting.   
This paper contends that sovereignty shapes both the problem of tax competition 
and the solution of cooperation.  Understanding the functional and normative goals 
underlying nation-states’ claims for tax sovereignty can enable us to assess, predict and 
influence prospects for tax cooperation.  As I have argued elsewhere,2 claims of tax 
sovereignty are proffered in a variety of situations, by a variety of actors, with a variety 
of motives, but there are nonetheless several core goals that are at risk when a nation-
state makes the decision to surrender some measure of its tax power.  An understanding 
                                                 
∗ Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  I would like to thank Ilan Benshalom, Yariv Brauner, and 
James Repetti, and the participants in the University of Montreal Workshop on “Tax Competition: How to 
Meet the Normative and Political Challenge,” and the University of Florida International Tax Symposium 
for their helpful comments. 
1 Many of the tax havens joined together in an effort to resist the OECD harmful tax competition project.  
See, e.g., Free-Market Activists Ask Cayman Islands to Rescind OECD Commitment, 22 TAX NOTES INT’L 
2971 (June 11, 2001) (noting a May 2001 presentation at the Cayman Islands Chamber of Commerce 
meeting to encourage the Cayman Islands to rethink its commitment to comply with the OECD tax 
competition recommendations). 
2 Diane Ring, What’s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 




of these goals and principles helps highlight unresolved issues in tax competition 
conversations, fruitful avenues for cooperation efforts, and the connections among inter-
nation equity (which presumes sovereignty), inter-individual equity, and competition. 
 This paper does not seek to establish whether and when tax competition is good or 
bad.  That is a distinct question reflecting assessments of government action, the market, 
externalities, and behavioral predictions.  Instead, this paper assumes that some subset of 
countries will contend that certain tax competition is undesirable.  From that baseline, the 
paper considers the question of how sovereignty shapes arguments over the merits of tax 
competition and how sovereignty influences the design of responses to tax competition.  
Part I provides a basic overview of sovereignty concepts, in particular their relevance to a 
nation-state desirous of control over tax policy.  Part II defines tax competition, identifies 
the different kinds of states involved, reviews the emergence of the OECD project to 
limit harmful tax competition, and traces the EU experience with tax competition.  Part 
III explores the normative grounds for challenging tax competition and the role of 
sovereignty in shaping and limiting these challenges.  Finally, Part IV, working from the 
practical and theoretical baselines established in Part III, considers how an appreciation 
of sovereignty claims can facilitate the design of plausible cooperation strategies for 
states trying to limit tax competition. 
I. THE SOVEREIGNTY BACKDROP 
The consideration of tax competition, and the corresponding prospects for 
cooperation take place against the backdrop of a world in which sovereign nation-states 
are the dominant actors in promulgating tax rules and collecting (and using) tax 
revenues.3  Sovereignty bears no single definition, but a reasonable starting point 
envisions a sovereign state as one which possesses three core elements: “territory, people, 
and a government.”4  In possessing these elements, a sovereign state should display 
                                                 
3 This paper takes as a premise that the global system we currently see is one in which “sovereign” states 
play a key role.  This premise is not undermined by acknowledging that the definition of a sovereign state 
faces controversy, nor by the recognition that many non-state actors play a vital role (including 
international organizations and multinational enterprises).  The identification of our global system as one 
based on sovereign states does not imply a claim that these states are all powerful, exclusive, or monolithic 
actors.  Rather it asserts that they continue to have a central organizing and decision making role.  
Moreover, the prospect that the “degree” of sovereignty may be shifting (i.e. that for example, international 
organizations are gaining more power) is not inconsistent with the paper’s premise. 
4 Ring, supra note __ at [4 ]note 9 (quoting MICHAEL ROSS FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER 




internal control and supremacy, along with external independence from other states.5  As 
the 20th century has come to a close, the sovereign state stands as more than a nation with 
internal control and external independence regarding people, territory and government 
(i.e. the possessor of a series of rights to exclude and control).  The sovereign is also the 
locus of a duty and an obligation to protect and promote the welfare of its citizens.6  
Sovereign responsibilities now accompany those sovereign rights. 
What doesn’t “sovereignty” presume or promise?  It does not presume equality of 
situation.  Most considerations of sovereignty and a world system based on sovereign 
states anticipate that states will vary significantly in their resources and power,7 and that 
the exercise of such power is not inconsistent with the premises of the sovereign state 
system.  In sharp contrast, the “unprovoked” invasion of the territorial sanctity of another 
state would likely violate the principles and shared expectations of the sovereign state 
system.   
Of course the existence of the sovereign state system and the ability to define it 
are not the same as a seal of approval.  Even if the current world political order takes 
sovereign states as the primary decision makers (a positive observation),8 is that 
normatively desirable?  The “desirability” of sovereign states raises a series of deeper 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., HENDRIK SPRUYT, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS 38-39 (1994); FOWLER & 
BUNCK, supra note __ at 37. 
6 See, e.g., Fowler & Bunck, supra note __ at 6, 73; Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights, Principled Issue–
Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 INT’L ORG. 411, 413 (1993) (“[U]ntil  World War II, in the 
widest range of issues, the treatment of subjects remained within the discretion of the state”). 
7 “Historically, one or the other of the major principles associated with sovereignty has always been under 
challenge. . . . Only a very few states have actually possessed all of the major attributes that are associated 
with sovereignty – territoriality, autonomy, recognition, and effective control – the United States being the 
most obvious case. . . . Hence, in some sense, almost all of the states of the world have been semi-
sovereign.”  Stephen D. Krasner, Pervasive Not Perverse: Semi-Sovereigns as the Global Norm, 30 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 651, 652 (1977). Although the reality of widely differing sovereign states is accepted, 
we find, deeper within the interstices of sovereignty theory, conflict over how states differ.  The debate 
questions whether it is more accurate to see sovereign states as beginning with a uniform package of 
sovereign state rights and powers, some of which they may lose in the rough and tumble world of power, 
resources, strategy and luck – or whether some states become sovereigns without the rights and 
expectations that other states may possess.  See, e.g., FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note __ at 29, 42, 63-68; cf. 
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 27 (1995) (“[s]maller and poorer 
states are almost entirely dependent on the international economic and political system for nearly 
everything they need to maintain themselves as functioning societies.”). 
8 Some observers have argued that sovereignty is dead or dying, although this is an empirical point.  Ring, 
supra note __ at [8] (considering claims that the sovereign state system is in decline).  Whether the system 
is dead or dying (which some seriously challenge) tells us nothing about whether this would be good or bad 
as a normative matter. Id. at [8-9] (examining the competing view that interprets recent changes in the role 




questions regarding society, justice, human nature, and political science.  Can we 
envision the alternative to the sovereign state system (e.g., a single global state, or states 
based not on territory but on “people” or “religion”9) and what are its weaknesses?  
Although this paper does not aim to resolve the normative question of whether a 
sovereign state system is good, Part III pursues one strand of this inquiry (theories of 
cosmopolitan justice) because an assessment of sovereignty’s impact on the tax 
competition debate requires consideration of how advocates press their claims.  At 
present, it is useful to make one observation and one assertion.  The observation is that 
the sovereign state system is sufficiently healthy and active, as a positive matter, to 
require that any serious tax competition discussion confront the reality of sovereign 
states.  The assertion, argued by the author elsewhere,10 is that one important “right” of 
the sovereign state – tax sovereignty—carries meaningful content.  States’ anxiety over 
tax sovereignty can be legitimate (although it can also be a smokescreen for less palatable 
or reputable goals).  The ability to control tax policy enables a state to meet its functional 
duties (revenue raising and fiscal policy design) and support its two important democratic 
norms – democratic accountability and democratic legitimacy.11  Recognizing this role of 
tax sovereignty for a democratic sovereign state becomes important as we explore how 
we might further clarify and expand the duties and obligations between and among 
sovereign states on the subject of tax competition.12
Obviously states do not exercise unimpeded control over tax policy choices – they 
are influenced and constrained by the political economy within their own domestic 
system (e.g., pressure from powerful taxpayers) and by the need to account for the 
implications of their tax rules globally (e.g., will the state’s new tax be deemed a 
creditable foreign tax by other countries).  However, the lack of absolute control does not 
                                                 
9 A world (such as ours) in which international organizations and multinational enterprises influence and 
shape outcomes is not an alternative to a sovereign state system.  It is a version of such a system. 
10 Ring, supra note __. 
11 Control over tax policy by the states supports goals of democratic accountability and legitimacy because 
the nation-state (in contrast to certain global structures) provides a closer connection between decision 
maker and voter, and because the nation-state is more likely to constitute a demos – a certain type of 
political community considered valuable to true democratic legitimacy in government rule.  Ring, supra 
note __ at 172-77, 213-14; infra text accompanying note [90?]. 
12 This assertion could be interpreted as a normative claim of the paper.  However, even for readers who 
may challenge the value of these elements of tax sovereignty – as a descriptive matter they form the 




render a state’s interest in maintaining substantial control an implausible or irrational 
position.  Furthermore, an expression of interest in retaining more control over tax policy 
does not translate into a blanket unwillingness to cooperate. 
Beyond establishing a descriptive understanding of sovereignty and an 
appreciation for the most persuasive normative claims to tax sovereignty, it will also be 
important to identify the positive role tax sovereignty plays in rhetoric and national 
decision making.  Although not wholly independent of the functional and normative roles 
for tax sovereignty referenced above, the broadly characterized right of a nation to 
sovereignty over tax matters has proven a potent tool of rhetoric (often without extensive 
grounding or clarification) in policy debates.13  Even national governments are not 
immune to the magnetism of the rhetoric.14  Tax sovereignty, though, is not a “good” in 
and of itself.  Rather, it is a tool to achieve important missions of the democratic 
sovereign state: (1) the continued operation and existence of a functioning government 
(predicated on revenue and sustainable fiscal policy) and, (2) the accountability and 
legitimacy underpinning that democratic state.  But even though tax sovereignty can be a 
tool for good, sovereignty ideals do not answer the question, “what should be the 
response to and the outcome of tax competition?” As explored later in the paper, if an 
appropriate state goal is not tax sovereignty per se, but rather the functional and 
normative goals stated above, we may revise our expectations about the need for and 
required scope of tax sovereignty.  Moreover, to the extent that the examination of tax 
competition moves beyond the theoretical and into the practical, strategic realm, a 
realistic appreciation of the lure of “tax sovereignty” claims becomes an invaluable asset. 
One important way to consider the question of how to achieve cooperation in tax 
competition is to consider how knowledge about tax sovereignty might guide us.  If we 
are sensitive to tax sovereignty, what should we highlight or emphasize to encourage 
                                                 
13 For example, the consideration of a variety of “tax harmonization” possibilities in the European Union, 
including the prospect of a common consolidated corporate tax base has generated innumerable comments 
from business, government officials and others on the perceived sovereignty implications of such a move.  
See, e.g., Bruno Gibert, Chairman of the European Joint Transfer Pricing Forum, Remarks at European 
Competitiveness Roundtable, European Competitiveness Roundtable: Competition View with Common 
Case, (Dec. 1, 2006), in INT’L TAX REV., available at 2006 WLNR 23404159. See generally, Ring, supra 
note __ at 209-213. 
14 See, e.g., Steinbruck Accuses Ireland of Unfair Tax Practices, 46 TAX NOTES INT’L 1197 (June 18, 2007) 
(at meeting of the EU Council of Economic and Finance Ministers, Ireland repeated its objection to the 




cooperative action?  What should we avoid?  What techniques or cooperative methods of 
responding to tax competition are most likely to be successful and why? 
Finally, although this article firmly accepts the reality of an international system 
premised on sovereign states and operates with a core definition of sovereignty reflecting 
the modern conception of rights and duties of the state, this vision need not be fixed for 
time.  Our conception of the sovereign state developed over the 20th century to 
incorporate ideas regarding human rights and anti-imperialism.15  It is possible that the 
fiscal challenges of the 21st century will further refine our vision of appropriate and 
necessary tax sovereignty for the sovereign state.  Even if this refinement in the 
sovereignty concept ultimately takes root, the proscriptions for tax competition cannot 
significantly anticipate such a shift.  The experience of tax competition may be crucial in 
defining a new "tax sovereignty", but that experience cannot realistically dictate a view of 
sovereignty and cooperation dramatically different from the one that currently holds sway 
in most states.  Instead, tax competition policy, and any calls for cooperation, must 
remain part of an interactive relationship among fiscal reality, operational solutions, and 
prevailing ideas of the sovereignty.  Tax competition might lead the global community to 
a new vision of tax sovereignty but it cannot drag it there. 
 
II. TAX COMPETITION AND THE LOCUS OF SOVEREIGNTY ARGUMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE TAX COMPETITION CONCEPT 
Just as an understanding of sovereignty is necessary to assess its impact on the tax 
competition debate, so too is a precise consideration of what is intended by the term “tax 
competition.”  Tax policy discussions are notorious for widely (and wildly) differing uses 
of terminology,16 and the active debate over tax competition proves no exception.  In its 
                                                 
15 See Sikkink, supra note __ at 413; Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical 
Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World, 41 INT’L ORG. 519, 526 (1987) (following 
World War II, colonialism “became controversial and finally unacceptable in principle.”); Fowler & 
Bunck, supra note __ at 73 (“A century ago sovereignty implied that a state could go to war whenever it 
pleased.  Once again, states have renounced such a sovereign prerogative.”). 
16 A glaring example from U.S. political discourse on tax reform is the use of the term “flat tax” to mean 
and convey a wide range of ideas, some of which are not even inherent to the idea of a flat (i.e. single rate) 
tax system.  See e.g., Michael Graetz, Statement on Flat Tax Proposals Presented at Hearings Before the 
Senate Finance Committee on May 18, 1995, 67 TAX NOTES 1256 (May 29, 1995) (noting that contrary to 




broadest conception the phrase captures a country’s use of any feature of its tax system to 
“enhance” its competitive advantage in the marketplace for capital, investment, and/or 
nominal business presence.  The tax features readily susceptible to enlistment in this 
mission include tax rates, tax base, administrative system,17 transparency, disclosure, 
information sharing, and special credits, exemptions and deduction.   
Much of the current debate over tax competition emerged in the aftermath of the 
OECD’s 1998 project on “Harmful Tax Competition.”  The competition identified and 
targeted in that project (and through the OECD’s subsequent efforts and reports) is much 
narrower than the broad definition of tax competition above.  First, the OECD sought to 
identify and address harmful tax competition, not all tax competition. The OECD 
expressed a commitment to the view that “there are no particular reasons why any two 
countries should have the same level and structure of taxation” and that “[c]ountries 
should remain free to design their own tax systems as long as they abide by 
internationally accepted standards in doing so.”18 Second, at the time of the 1998 project, 
the OECD was not prepared to consider all realms of tax competition in its effort to ferret 
out the harmful versions.  The Report and its recommendations focused on 
“geographically mobile activities, such as financial and other service activities, including 
the provision of intangibles.”19  Questions of competition for less geographically mobile 
activities (such as manufacturing, plants, and equipment) and for cross-border interest-
bearing instruments were reserved for later work.20   
                                                                                                                                                 
have a single rate, do not guarantee a low tax burden, and are often actually consumption as opposed to 
income taxes). 
17 This could include the opportunity for taxpayers to “negotiate” with the state over ultimate tax 
obligations. 
18 OECD 1998 Report, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE at 15.  For some 
readers, the OECD statements in both the 1998 Report and the 2000 Progress Report provided no adequate 
acknowledgement of the benefits from tax competition, although the 2001 Progress Report did include an 
explicit recognition that competition contributed to the desirable base broadening and tax rate reductions of 
the 1990s.  See, e.g., Easson, supra note __ at 1054.  The OECD in recent years has expressly stated that it 
does not aim to create a system of uniform rates.  See, e.g., TNI Interview: Jeffrey Owens, TAX NOTES 
INT’L 913, 917 (May 28, 2007) (“the OECD favors competition and that includes tax competition,” and “I 
believe that in the longer term, having countries compete on the basis of tax rates and the business 
friendliness of their tax environment (e.g., the consistency and certainty surrounding the application of tax 
rules) is probably healthier than competing by means of “niche” regimes”). 
19 OECD 1998 Report, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE at 8. 
20 Id. at 8-9.  Taxation of interest, including interest on bank deposits was reserved at least in part because it 
was currently under examination as part of a plan to explore the use of withholding taxes and exchange of 




An important thread that runs through the public discourse on tax competition, 
both in the context of the OECD and elsewhere (such as the European Union) is the belief 
that there is a gap between stated goals and ultimate desires.  Critics of the OECD tax 
competition project and also of certain efforts at tax harmonization in the EU object not 
only to the explicit plans and proposals on the table (e.g. the OECD’s 1998 harmful tax 
competition recommendations) but to what they believe are the unstated and more 
extreme end goals (e.g., uniform rates).21  Both organizations, the OECD and the EU, are 
limited in their ability to persuade critics that their goals are more modest.  Just like 
legislatures, these are entities with many members holding differing views on the 
underlying questions.  The majority may support a particular step (e.g., the 1998 OECD 
Report or the EU common consolidated corporate tax base) but may have very different 
rationales and very different views on the appropriate extensions of that step.  
 B. THE STATES IN THE TAX COMPETITION DEBATE 
As we consider sovereign state claims for fiscal control, moral claims for global 
justice, and the possible outcome for tax competition, we must differentiate the various 
competition scenarios likely to be at issue.  In describing the tax competition cases, this 
section targets three major features -- the identity of the state in the debate (OECD 
member or not – as an initial indicator of likely power, wealth and resources), the type of 
activity or investment the competing state’s behavior seeks to attract, and the success of 
that competitive effort.  The attention to these factors is not intended to suggest that they 
are the exclusive points of distinction among competition cases.  For example, not all 
havens are in developing, less regulated environments (see, e.g., the role of Switzerland 
and Luxembourg).  Also, not all havens are only havens – Belgium and the Netherlands 
function as headquarters “havens” despite having many other developed business and 
investment activities.  And finally, competition can be fictitious (i.e. competition over 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Eileen O’Grady, United Kingdom Holds Its Ground in Opposing EU Tax Harmony, 31 Tax 
Notes Int’l 1121, 1122 (2003) (quoting a British government spokesman in Brussels, “The Commission 
talks about moving to majority voting only on issues of tax administration in Europe – but that is a slippery 
slope.”); David Cay Johnson, Former I.R.S. Chiefs Back Tax Haven Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2001, 
at C1 (following then-Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill’s rejection of the OECD project on the grounds that 
the U.S. does not support harmonization of tax systems, a “bipartisan group of tax commissioners 
suggested that Mr. O’Neill was misinformed about the purpose of the [tax competition] campaign,” and 
that the “project explicitly rejects harmonizing tax codes,” and that any effort to “unify tax rates would not 




fictitious activities),22 can involve real but specialized or limited regimes, or can be 
comprehensive and broad based.  This section organizes the tax competition discussion 
by identifying categories of state actors based on their status, behavior, and success 
because these elements capture the state’s interests, goals and motivations, and provide a 
strong baseline for evaluating prospects for cooperation. 
  1. OECD member states eager to limit tax competition:  This group 
of countries forms the backbone of the OECD initiative.  They are higher income 
countries with significant infrastructure and social welfare benefits whose multinational 
corporations and wealthy individual investors avail themselves of a range of attractive tax 
opportunities abroad, including but not limited to low tax rates, nondisclosure of 
information (tax and financial), “taxpayer-friendly” administrations, and special regimes 
(investment, headquarters, “fictitious” location/activities).  Some of these competitive tax 
features may be within the ambit of the OECD harmful tax competition category. 
  2.  OECD member states engaging in competitive behavior:  As 
part of the OECD’s project on harmful tax competition launched in 1998 (from which 
Switzerland and Luxembourg were the only member countries to abstain),23 the member 
states themselves were asked to examine their own domestic tax practices for any 
regimes that would be deemed harmful under the organization’s guidelines. Among 
member states, 47 preferential tax regimes were labeled as potentially harmful.  Sensitive 
to accusations that the OECD did not move as aggressively or quickly against member 
states, the OECD’s 2004 Progress Report noted that 18 of these member regimes had 
been or were being abolished, 14 had been revised to eliminate the potentially harmful 
features, and 13 of the regimes were deemed not harmful.24  The two remaining regimes 
(Switzerland and Luxembourg) were then under discussion and ultimately resolved.25  
The fact that the harmful preferential regimes in OECD member countries – and in many 
                                                 
22 See Oxfam Report, June 2000 at 6. 
23 Both countries abstained from the report and provided written statements outlining their concerns, 
including those based on the information exchange proposals in the OECD plan.  OECD 1998 REPORT ON 
HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 73-78. 
24 OECD 2004 PROGRESS REPORT at 7-13 ; Easson, supra note __ at 1046. 
25 By the time of the 2006 Progress Report, the Switzerland issue had been resolved.  OECD 2006 UPDATE 
ON PROGRESS IN MEMBER COUNTRIES at 4.  Soon after the release of the 2006 Report, the Luxembourg 
regime at issue (1929 Holding Companies) was repealed by domestic law.  See Jean-Baptiste Brekelmans, 




of the havens that the OECD identified were addressed does not invite the conclusion that 
competition was eliminated.  After the United States announced a significant shift in the 
scope of its support for the OECD project in May 2001,26 the standard for what 
constituted cooperation with the project changed to consist of a commitment to improve 
transparency of the tax system and to exchange information (evidenced by the havens’ 
willingness to enter into exchange of information agreements).27  Although these 
measures do (if fully executed) curb certain competitive (perhaps more aptly labeled 
evasion) behaviors, much remains open to competition.  As the OECD head of the Centre 
for Tax Policy and Administration acknowledged in 2007:  
OECD work in eliminating harmful preferential regimes characterized by 
a lack of transparency, ring-fencing, and with no effective exchange of 
information – has been very successful. . . . Yet, what we see today is a 
slow proliferation of what I call ‘niche’ regimes that are designed to meet 
OECD and EU standards, but which nevertheless, give a country a 
competitive edge. . . .You can see this as a healthy sign that tax 
competition is thriving, but there is a danger that we will end up with tax 
systems looking very much like the proverbial Swiss cheese: more holes 
than substance.28
 
Certainly one can anticipate that the same potential for newer, carefully tailored niche 
regimes exists outside the OECD as well. 
    3.  Non-OECD states that feel “forced” to engage in tax 
competition to secure significant, nonmobile business investment (e.g. manufacturing, 
production, etc):  Some developing countries consider tax competition their only option 
to retain or attract “real” business investment.29  Such countries would prefer a system in 
which they could both collect reasonable tax revenues and maintain investment in their 
economy.  Within this group of countries, there are likely instances in which their 
perception that they must compete (at least in the short term) to attract and keep 
otherwise fairly mobile business investment is accurate.  Implicit in agreeing with their 
need to “compete” is a determination that the benefits of investment encouraged by 
                                                 
26 See, infra text accompanying note ___. 
27 See, e.g., Easson, supra note __ at __; OECD 2001 PROGRESS REPORT. 
28 TNI Interview: Jeffrey Owens, TAX NOTES INT’L 913, 917 (May 28. 2007). 
29 See, e.g., Yoram Margolioth, Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investments & Growth: Using the Tax 
System to Promote Developing Country Growth, 23 VA TAX REV. 161 (2003) (exploring the ways in which 




competition through taxes more than offset the loss in revenue.30  However, also within 
this group are likely cases in which the state is in error in assuming that the benefits from 
competition outweigh forgone revenue, either because the benefits of that investment to 
the state were low or because business was likely to choose to invest in that state for 
other reasons.  In such cases, the state would be better off not engaging in competition.  
In making this determination, it is assumed that other countries will continue to engage in 
tax competition.  The only question, given that condition, is whether the state in question 
truly gains from competition.  There is a separate question as to whether all countries 
would gain from an agreement not to engage in this competition – i.e. whether there is a 
race to the bottom where all states are losers.  The implications of this question for 
cooperation by sovereign states are taken up in Part III. 
  4.  Non-OECD members engaged in tax competition over mobile 
financial and other activities: These states include both those more likely to be 
characterized as tax havens (whether under the OECD’s 1998 formal definition, including 
the absence of substantial activities31 or more colloquially), and those states which would 
not typically be thought of as havens but which may have a regime competing for such 
activities.  The former might be the most resistant to change, assuming that their 
dominant commercial existence is perceived to be as a “haven” for business and wealthy 
individuals from the tax regimes of their residence countries.  However, in both cases 
there is the question of whether the state is accurate in its determination that the 
competitive behavior is a net positive for the country (lost revenue v. benefits).  Not only 
could the calculus be inaccurate, it could be measuring costs and benefits for only a 
segment of society – the competition may benefit some subset of the state, but overall be 
                                                 
30 An extensive literature has developed to measure and assess the impact of tax competition on business 
decisions.  Not surprisingly the results are complicated and depend on a variety of factors including the 
nature of the investment, whether it constitutes new investment, and the non-tax factors against which it 
competes in driving the final business decisions.  See, e.g., Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, The Three 
Parties in the Race to the Bottom: Host Governments, Home Governments and Multinational Companies, 
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1613 (Dec. 2005); Mihir A Desai, C. Fritz Foley, & James R. Hines, Jr.,  
Do Tax Havens Divert Economic Activity? Ross School of Business Paper No. 1024 (April 2005); Rosanne 
Altshuler, Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newton, Has U.S. Investment Abroad Become More Sensitive to Tax 
Rates? NBER Working Paper No. W6383 (Jan. 1998); Dhammika Dharmapala & James R. Hines, Jr.,  
Which Countries Become Tax Havens? (2006); Harry Gruber & John Mutti, Do Taxes Influence Where 
U.S. Corporations Invest? 53 NAT’L TAX J. (2000). 
31 OECD 1998 Report on Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue at 23 (listing four key 
factors in identifying tax havens: no or nominal taxes; lack of effective exchange of information; lack of 




undesirable. (Once again, as with category three above, we assume a world in which 
continued tax competition by other states is a given). 
 
The grouping of states into different categories above is intended to facilitate the 
consideration of motives and rationales that might ultimately generate some measure of 
cooperation.  To further that effort, a brief review of the evolution of the tax competition 
debate in the OECD and the EU is outlined in the next section. 
  C. EVOLVING POSITIONS ON TAX COMPETITION 
 In the years following the OECD’s 1998 report, an anti-OECD momentum 
developed, fueled in part by the labors of the U.S.-based Center for Freedom and 
Prosperity (CFP), which was formed in 2000 with a mission to challenge the OECD’s 
Tax Competition project and the United States’ participation in that work.32  The CFP 
lobbied both Congress and the administration, and many of the tax havens.  With the 
Congressional Black Caucus, the CFP characterized the tax competition project as 
harmful to poor, developing, neighboring countries.33  In other government circles, the 
CFP contended that the project would ultimately harm the United States both because the 
United States itself is a successful tax haven and because U.S. taxpayers benefit from the 
existence and use of (other) tax havens.34 And with the havens, the CFP encouraged their 
resistance to OECD efforts to secure haven compliance with the recommendations of the 
tax competition report.35  The United States, then under a new Bush administration 
                                                 
32 See Ring, supra note __ at 187. 
33 Ring, supra note __ at 188 n.136.  See also, Thomas Field, Tax Competition in Europe and America, 29 
TAX NOTES INT’L 1235, 1242-43 (2003); Cordia Scott, Congressional Black Caucus Says OECD Tax 
Moves Unfairly Blasts Developing Nations, 22 TAX NOTES INT’L 1600, 1600-01 (2001).  Letter from the 
Cong. Black Caucus to Paul O’Neill, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, (Mar. 14, 2001) available at 
http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/cbc/pdf. 
34 Ring, supra note __ at 191-93 (describing the CFP campaign).  See Daniel Mitchell, An OECD Proposal 
to Eliminate Tax Competition Would Mean Higher Taxes and Less Privacy, 21 TAX NOTES INT’L 1799, 
1821 (2000) (“the OECD initiative. . . . is a threat to America’s national interests. . [and] will be bad for 
U.S. taxpayers”); Letter from Don Nickles, U.S. Senator, to Paul O’Neill, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury (Feb. 
6, 2001) (“Our relatively low-tax status has fueled economic growth and enabled our economy to draw 
investors and savings from many of our high-tax European competitors.  Those competitors will eventually 
use the OECD initiative as a weapon to undermine our own sovereignty right to enact pro-growth tax 
policies.”). 
35 Ring, supra  note __ at 195.  Two of the founders of the CFP convinced Antigua to allow them to 
represent the state as “its official delegates to a January OECD summit with other Caribbean tax-have 
countries.”  David S. Cloud, Virginian Fights for International Tax Havens: Lobbying Finds Bush 




(2001), withdrew its prior strong support for the OECD project.  The Secretary of the 
Treasury announced in May 2001 that the “United States does not support efforts to 
dictate to any country what its own tax rates or tax systems should be, and will not 
participate in any initiative to harmonize world tax systems.  The United States simply 
has no interest in stifling the competition that forces governments – like businesses – to 
create efficiencies.”36  Although the United States ultimately continued participating in 
the OECD tax competition project, the involvement and the scope of the project were 
both scaled back.37
 As the OECD has grappled with how to frame its challenge to tax competition and 
how to respond to the debates that challenge has generated, the European Union has 
similarly devoted substantial energy to questions of tax competition and tax 
harmonization within its borders.38  The ultimate question of EU tax harmonization 
begins with the rules for voting on tax matters.  Although the EU uses qualified majority 
voting (QMV) for a growing number of issues, taxation remains subject to unanimous 
voting rules.39  The unsuccessful EU Constitutional Treaty would have expanded the 
number of issues subject to QMV, but nonetheless anticipated retaining unanimous 
voting for taxation.40  The special place reserved for tax matters in the pantheon of EU 
voting sends a resounding message of tax sovereignty.  Even if these voting rules do not 
reflect the aspirational goals of many in the EU, the rules certainly reflect the clear reality 
of what is currently plausible – and what is not – in the EU today.  Against such a 
backdrop, it is not surprising that the efforts to harmonize the corporate tax base of EU 
members faced resistance.41   
                                                 
36 Cordia Scott, U.S. Secretary Says OECD Tax Haven Crackdown is Out of Line; Treasury and OECD 
Hold Talks in Paris, 2001 WTD 92-1 (May 11, 2001). 
37 See, e.g., Ring, supra note __ at 189; Easson, supra note __at 1059-1063. 
38 See, e.g., Carlo Pinto, Tax Competition and EU Law (2003); Easson, supra note __ at 1047. 
39 EU website, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/council/index_en.htm.  See also, Sir William Nicoll & 
Trevor C. Salmon, UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN UNION 25, 555-56 (2001). 
40 See EU website, http://europa .eu/scadplus/constitution/majority_en.htm.  
41 Interpretations of the EU tax competition experience to date have an aspect of the glass half full, glass 
half empty quality about them.  Although the history behind the EU’s savings directive could be viewed as 
suggesting increasing tax unity in the EU, the continued resistance to QMV for direct taxation provides a 
powerful statement regarding the EU members desire to retain the ability to say no to cooperation, even 
when they may sometimes ultimately say yes.  See generally Cynthia Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit 
Information with Other Countries: Should Tax Compliance or Privacy Claims Prevail?, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 




Several fears dominate the harmonization debates and they reflect the different 
socio-economic positions of various member states.  For example, those EU members 
who consider their tax systems to be significant, attractive features of their total business 
climate (e.g., Ireland, United Kingdom) resisted steps that shift control over tax system 
design away from the national government and toward the EU because they anticipated 
that higher tax rates will result.42  Even where the issues on the table have concerned only 
corporate tax base harmonization or voting majorities on administrative tax matters (and 
not the admittedly sensitive subject of rates), suspicion lingered that a concession of 
“sovereignty” here would effectively open the floodgates to loss of state control over 
crucial tax policy.43  According to this story, low tax rates in countries such as the United 
Kingdom and Ireland would be the first casualty in this loss of state power.  But, perhaps 
somewhat counterintuitively, the other major set of EU members resisting harmonization 
efforts in taxation were Denmark, Sweden, and Finland.  Characterized as “high-tax, 
high-welfare states,”44 these Nordic states placed a high priority on maintaining their 
social welfare systems and considered efforts at tax harmonization as a threat that would 
in the future force them to lower their tax rates.45
These insights from the EU experience with tax competition highlight several 
points.  First, even among developed countries, there can be a strong resistance to steps 
perceived to constitute a surrender of tax sovereignty and control over tax decision-
making.46  Second, resistance to tax harmonization ideas in the EU is not restricted to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Interest Is a Multiple-Choice Game: Withhold, Report, Ignore, 28 TAX NOTES INT’L 459 (Nov. 2. 2002) 
(same). 
42 See, e.g., Chuck Gnaedinger, EU Parliament President Discusses Tax Veto Under Draft Constitution, 30 
TAX NOTES INT’L 1312, 1312 (2003) (commenting on the impact of lower tax rates in Ireland and 
England).  Whether these fears are realistic is a separate matter. 
43 See, e.g., Turlough O’Sullivan, EU Tax Policy is Bad News for Business, IRISH TIMES, June 8, 2007, 
Finance Sec. at 14 (expressing the view that the common corporate tax base project in the EU would result 
in higher taxes for Irish business outside the EU and or higher tax rates in Ireland and contending that 
“[m]ember states must maintain their sovereignty over tax issues and retain their ability to adopt taxation 
policies suitable to their needs.”); Eileen O’Grady, United Kingdom Holds Its Ground in Opposing EU Tax 
Harmony, 31 TAX NOTES INT’L 1121, 1122 (2003) (quoting a British government spokesperson in Brussels, 
“Tax is the province of the national states. . . . Anything to do with tax is about sovereignty, and the 
Treasury must have control over how and what is collected.”); see supra note [20]. 
44 Chuck Gnaedinger, EU Parliament President Discusses Tax Veto Under Draft Constitution, 30 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 1312, 1312 (2003) (quoting European Parliament President Cox). 
45 Id. 
46 See, e.g., Julie Roin, Taxation without Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61 (2002) (considering the 




more “tax competitive” of its members.  The position of the Nordic members reminds us 
that support for tax sovereignty need not be a “cover” for tax competition strategies; it 
can embrace a broader set of concerns about regulating the system of taxation and 
expenditure in a state.  Third, the EU story reinforces the reality that no debate takes 
place in isolation.  Part of the objection to both qualified majority voting for tax 
administrative matters and to corporate tax base harmonization derived not from the 
actual effects of change on those issues, but to the possibility that they would lead 
directly or indirectly to tax rate changes that were deemed very undesirable.  Questions of 
good faith and “inevitable” tax policy creep infiltrate the debate and can be difficult to 
dismiss, even among states already formally committed to each other to a degree not seen 
elsewhere in the world. 
 
III. THEORETICAL CHALLENGES TO TAX COMPETITION AND THE UNDERLYING 
VISION OF SOVEREIGNTY 
A. NORMATIVE CLAIMS AGAINST TAX COMPETITION: AN INTRODUCTION  
How is tax competition justified?  The dominant arguments articulated on behalf 
of tax competition sound in efficiency.47  The strong version of the argument maintains 
that all tax competition is good because it will lead to an efficient market in government 
services.  But is a market analogy appropriate for taxation?  The answer turns on the 
purposes and the effects of taxation.48  Taxation can be characterized as a market in 
which different governments offer different packages of goods and services (e.g., 
security, roads, educated workforce) in return for a certain price, “taxes.”  The market 
image maintains that the states compete with each other to provide their services and 
goods at the best price.  By eliminating waste and inefficiency in its provision of goods 
                                                 
47 See, e.g., Letter from Milton Friedman and over 200 other economists urging President Bush to reject the 
OECD’s tax competition project (May 31, 2001) 2001 WTD 107-31 (“Tax competition is a liberalizing 
force in the world economy, something that should be celebrated rather than persecuted.  It forces 
governments to be more fiscally responsible lest they drive economic activity to lower- tax 
environments.”); Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax 
Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543 (2001), M.B. Weiss, International Tax Competition: An Efficient or 
Inefficient Phenomenon?, 16 AKRON TAX J. 99 (2001); J.D. Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 
NAT’L TAX J. 269 (1999). 
48 Certainly much of tax policy, especially income taxation, directly affects and influences economic 
activity.  In designing tax rules we must be ever cognizant of their effects.  At a minimum, virtually all 
taxation we see today affects behavior.  Moreover, we regularly use tax policy to affirmatively shape 




and services, a state can reduce its price and be more “competitive.”  To the extent a 
“market” vision of taxation and government services (with an explicit role for tax 
competition) can improve efficiency in the provision of government services, certain 
competitive pressures in taxation can be quite positive.49  However, we must also 
confront the central ways in which tax regulation is different from other fields of 
regulation.  Most government regulation is premised on the view that the government 
steps in to resolve market failures including externalities and information costs.50  
Presumably if the market were fully functioning there would be no government 
involvement.  Such is not the story of taxation.   
First, states quite obviously impose taxes to collect revenues that fund 
government operations including more tangible infrastructure (e.g., roads, utilities) and 
less direct services (e.g., legislative functions, international negotiations, military, and 
defense).  One could imagine trying to force taxation to remain squarely in the “market” 
model by arguing for taxation on a benefits only principle: government is treated as just 
another service provider in the economy, which should charge for its services.  In some 
cases this may be feasible – and we do see certain government charges levied on a “use” 
basis (e.g., toll roads).51  But more broadly, this exercise is unrealistic.  Many of the 
goods are collective goods and/or the amount of each taxpayer’s use or benefit is 
indeterminate.  Thus, taxes are not imposed as pure benefit taxes.  Second, taxation as a 
theoretical matter has affirmatively adopted a distributive role in society.52  It is not 
merely practical considerations that prevent the design and pursuit of pure benefits 
                                                 
49 See, e.g., supra note [12]. 
50 Public choice theory of administrative law starts with the view that regulations are generally justified as a 
necessary response to market failure.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 
Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt Sci. 335 (1974) (discussing other regulatory theories as also viewing regulation as 
the government response to the existence of market failures); see also Sam Peltzman, Toward a More 
General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211, 212 (1976).  Of course, even if much regulation 
would be justified by market failure, the reality of the legislative and administrative process may produce 
an entirely different result.  Competing theories of regulation and administrative law (including public 
choice, neopluralism, and public interest) question the degree to which the ideal of regulation as a solution 
for market failure comports with the actual regulations implemented.  See Diane M. Ring, On the Frontier 
of Procedural Innovation: Advance Pricing Agreements and the Struggle to Allocate Income for Cross 
Border Taxation, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 143, 221-24 (2000). 
51 Although even here, any potential market comparison would be distorted by the fact that most consumer 
alternatives to the toll road are “free” roads supported by tax dollars. 
52 See, e.g., Ring, supra note [40] at 222; Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the 




taxation, but also philosophical and moral views on the meaning and legitimacy of 
government, its roles, and the duties and obligations of citizens:53  
[R]egulation in areas such as environment, food safety, and 
occupational safety differ from regulation in taxation and social security.  
The former represent acts of government intervention into conduct 
otherwise undertaken by the market.  The government justifies its 
intervention on the grounds of market failure.  In contrast, redistribution 
regimes such as taxation and social security, do not redress market failure 
but instead serve a function entirely separate from the market.54
 
If someone seeks to limit taxation solely to an economic service provider model, then a 
direct confrontation is required with the practical limitations of pricing government goods 
and services and with the redistributive political theories underlying the implementation 
of taxation and social security regimes in a democratic state.55
That said, those who view the tax competition question through a pure market 
competition lens can legitimately demand an explanation of how the above arguments 
regarding the special role for tax legislation in our society translate beyond national 
borders in a sovereign state world.  Such an advocate of tax competition could contend: 
(1) yes, the market price for government services may be imprecise, but as countries set 
their tax systems (and “tax prices”) for the business environment they offer, investor 
enthusiasm will tell them whether they have set their price too high or too low for the 
package they offer (leaving the countries the option of changing either); and (2) taxation 
might have a significant redistributive function (implicit in fairness features) domestically 
because that comports with our domestic socio-political commitment, but we have no 
such structure of commitment beyond our borders – that is the nature of a sovereign state 
system.  Thus, critics of tax competition must answer the challenge of the “pro-
competition” position. 
 B. AN EFFICIENCY CRITIQUE OF THE PRO-COMPETITION POSITION? 
One obvious option is to accept (at least for purposes of argument) the market 
model of taxation and demonstrate that this market experiences “failures” which, even 
                                                 
53 Asserting this goal as a principle of our political system does not suggest it is self-executing.  As noted 
elsewhere, the degree, contours, measurement, and context of “redistribution” in the domestic tax system 
remains contentious. 
54 Ring, supra note [40] at 223; see also Posner, supra note __; Croley, supra note [40] at 4 n.7. 





under a market model, would support intervention.  Thus, even if taxation constitutes a 
market in government services, regulation is justified where the market generates 
externalities.  The OECD 1998 report can be read as urging that view, at least in part: 
The [OECD] seeks to safeguard and promote an open, multilateral trading 
system and to encourage adjustment to that system to take into account the 
changing nature of international trade, including the interface between 
trade, investment and taxation.  [The report’s proposals] will further 
promote these objectives by reducing the distortionary influence of 
taxation on the location of mobile financial service activities, thereby 
promoting fair competition for real economic activities.56
 
Essentially, proponents of the OECD plan can justify the project on market failure 
grounds.57  The problem, however, in trying to cast harmful tax competition as market 
failure requiring government intervention (i.e. regulation) is that the necessary 
“regulation” would be supranational.  If the market experiencing failure is the states’ 
selling of services and infrastructure for the “price” of taxes, then presumably the design, 
implementation and enforcement of that regulatory intervention must come from a body 
above the market players – i.e. a suprastate body.58  But do supranational bodies possess 
the requisite authority?  Within the domestic arena the justification (as opposed to 
“need”) for government intervention itself and for the use of force by a state on its people 
derives from the nature and sources of legitimacy in a democratic sovereign state.59  The 
same rationale fails at the international level.  International bodies can be powerful and 
influential but their ability to use force is constrained by the nature of their legitimacy 
which differs from that of sovereign states.  Globally, we may see market failure but we 
do not see the same political theory supporting supranational imposition of force.  Yet 
that is what “regulation” of tax competition on market failure grounds would require.  
Without justification, what is the legitimate role here for the OECD, the EU or other 
global actor? 
                                                 
56 OECD 1998 REPORT ON HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE. 
57 The precise nature of that market failure may depend on context.  For example, where havens’ rules 
enable easily hidden financial assets to stay hidden, we might say the market lacks complete information.  
If a residence country has incomplete information on a taxpayer’s true income and financial situation, it is 
unable to charge the “accurate” price for the benefits being provided. 
58 For comparison, if the market for beef in the United States is experiencing some market failure (perhaps 
due to information and transaction costs) then remedial intervention would be needed at an enforceable 
level above the market participants (beef producers). 




 Proponents of the OECD project (or of similar efforts to limit certain tax 
competition) could challenge this interpretation of the market failure story by contending 
that their goal is only to curb such “harmful” tax competition and that they do not need or 
seek a supranational body to enforce it (and thus there will be no use of “force” to 
justify).  The OECD’s harmful tax competition recommendations would be consistent 
with a world in which no supranational body exists to govern these matters.  Why?  There 
is no use of force on other actors (including other states), instead merely a redesign of 
OECD members’ domestic tax and regulatory rules, actions well within the traditional 
scope of sovereign powers.   
Does acceptance of this OECD story line “answer” the proponents of tax 
competition?  That is if we agree (1) that taxation constitutes a market in government 
services, (2) that this market experiences failures (externalities from some competition), 
(3) that the failures justify intervention, (4) that the intervention must be supranational, 
and (5) that this intervention does not pose legitimacy and use of force concerns precisely 
because the intervention is not accomplished through force, have we resolved the debate 
over tax competition?  Clearly we have not – and the reason why reveals that arguments 
regarding tax competition are not confined to an efficiency framework but extend beyond 
to encompass ideas of international political structure and global society.  Some states 
resist efforts to change harmful tax practices on the grounds that these practices are 
valuable from their sovereign perspective (even if potentially inefficient globally).  Of 
course the states challenging tax competition consider certain competitive practices to be 
harmful from their sovereign perspective.  Thus, there is a clash of sovereign positions, 
and an appeal to global efficiency provides no clear trump card.   
Why do efficiency arguments fail to resolve the clash here, but not in a domestic 
market failure?  In a domestic market, the players (just like the states in tax competition) 
may not be concerned with system-wide efficiency and externalities.   However, these 
domestic players are part of a system which has invested the supra-market actor (i.e. the 
nation-state) with the authority to regulate and use force.  Where the participants in the 
market are sovereign states, there is no supranational government with legitimate 
authority to enforce regulation of the market for government services and taxes.  Thus, 




to resolve it.  The highest level actors with formal authority (the states) define their 
interests through their sovereign status.  Any appeal to change current behavior 
implicates not only on efficiency but also sovereignty – i.e. the “agreed” terms of global 
political organization.  The positions of both the OECD anti-competition states and the 
pro-competition states reflect this posturing.  The former emphasize the inefficiencies and 
externalities of the failed market but also identify the infringement upon the tax system of 
their own sovereign states by the competitive behaviors.  Conversely advocates for 
competition identify not only the potential benefits of broad competition by tax systems 
but also their “inherent” rights as sovereign states to design and utilize their tax systems 
to best support their state.  Resolution of this debate can only occur through the processes 
of international relations whereby sovereigns attempt to persuade others to accede to their 
views whether through enticements or threats of retaliation, or both.60  If limits on 
harmful tax competition would generate global efficiency gains, and if the winning states 
would share those gains with the losing states, a sufficient carrot could exist without a 
supra-state entity, however, winning states are not obliged to redistribute the gains.61  
 What do these observations on efficiency analysis of tax competition reveal?  
Recall that the goal of the paper is not to establish whether tax competition is good or 
bad, or whether it generates certain market failures or not.  Rather the point is to delineate 
how the structure of the tax competition problem derives from a sovereign state world 
and how traditional market regulation analysis of the problem fails for the same reason.  
Tax competition is a problem of sovereign states that cannot be regulated precisely 
because they are sovereign states.  Any solution must be a cooperative one grounded in 
the structure and reality of international relations among sovereign states.  To the extent 
that the much of the analytical discourse on tax competition has focused on assessing the 
efficiency consequences and merits of the competition and whether it should be 
regulated, the reality of the question as one more intimately connected to matters of 
international relations if often obscured. 
  C. EQUITY GROUNDS FOR CURBING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES 
                                                 
60 See supra text accompanying note ___ (discussing the basic framework of the sovereign state world 
system and what rights, duties, and behaviors are consistent with that system). 
61 If there is the possibility that eliminating “harmful” tax competition might be more efficient globally, but 
the benefit of that increased efficiency would not be distributed equally across the states, the anticipated 




   1. INTRODUCTION 
Other grounds on which tax competition has been challenged further reflect 
sovereignty’s role in both defining the problem and shaping potential resolutions.   What 
are these other normative grounds?  Two equity arguments, each mirrored in a classic 
story of tax competition, provide a central starting point.  In the first story, a society has 
implemented its income tax system (including a tax on income from capital) as part of a 
societal plan to provide a comprehensive range of benefits to its members (“social 
welfare”).  If that state then faces tax competition (sometimes the “competition” might be 
more aptly characterized as evasion), the state will be “forced” to either reduce those 
services and benefits, or alternatively, increase taxes on a less mobile base – typically 
employment and consumption.62  Either option potentially levies an increased burden on 
a subset of society, sparking equity concerns within that state.63  These equity concerns 
may dominate the story if the purported benefits of competition fail to materialize (i.e. the 
competition is “harmful” and does not improve government efficiency). 
In the second story, a developing country is trying to attract business, perhaps 
manufacturing, to further its economic growth.  The necessary and desired economic 
growth, however, requires both business activities (including investment and 
manufacturing) and tax revenues (used for infrastructure).  Where either prong is 
inadequate, the country’s growth, measured by the quality of government services64 and 
by the residents’ standard of living, is in peril.  If the developing country believes itself 
obliged to engage in tax competition (e.g., lower income tax rates on manufacturing 
profits earned in the jurisdiction), the revenue prong is compromised.  It may be possible 
for the country to exact some additional (i.e. compensating) revenue from sources not as 
sensitive to tax competition such as labor or less readily mobile commercial ventures.  
                                                 
62 See, e.g., Pedro Gomes & Francois Pouget, Corporate Tax Competition and the Decline of Public 
Investment, CESIFO WORKING PAPER No. 2384 (Sept. 2008) (their model, and simulations indicate that the 
corporate tax rate and public investment are endogenous and that “if the tax rate goes down by 15%, public 
investment in steady state goes down between 0.2% and 0.4% of GDP;” their empirical analysis indicates 
“higher values: between 0.6% and 1.1% of GDP.”) 
63 These concerns have been extensively explored in the literature.  See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, 
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1573 passim 
(2000); OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 13-16 (1998) [hereinafter 
OECD TAX COMPETITION REPORT]. 
64 Such government services include infrastructure facilitating business operations and social welfare 




But for a population of little wealth (an assumed fact given the country’s designation as a 
developing nation) these prospects are limited.  The resulting revenue fails to support 
much of the necessary internal development.  Moreover, it is not clear whether the 
competition for business investment garners the country any net increase in investment.  
As suggested in Part II’s outline of tax competition actors, a developing country may 
earnestly believe competition is necessary but may be wrong it its calculus.  From this 
perspective, who is the “winner” among the developing countries competing for global 
business investment?   
One assessment is that the multinational enterprises, and potentially their 
residence countries, benefit.  The multinationals gain because the income from business 
activities located in the competing developing countries bears little or no current tax (and 
presumably is structured so as to trigger little or no current residence country tax).  
Assuming that most multinationals are not owned by the residents of developing 
countries, the gain to the corporations translates into gain for its owners who are 
members of developed countries.  In addition to the corporations themselves (and their 
shareholders), the residence countries might see some gain – at least where the residence 
country uses a foreign tax credit, not an exemption system, to prevent double taxation of 
foreign source income.65  If little source country tax is collected, then little credit must 
offset the residence country’s collection of income tax.  This latter point (the revenue 
advantage to the developed/residence country) should not be overstated.  Profitable 
business operations located in developing countries are unlikely to be structured as 
permanent establishments instead of subsidiaries, and any dividend and interest payments 
by the foreign subsidiaries to their parent corporations in developed countries are 
discretionary.    
2. THE EQUITY LINK TO SOVEREIGNTY 
  a. DOMESTIC PURSUIT OF INTER-INDIVIDUAL EQUITY      
In both of these stories (a developed country supporting a social welfare system 
and a developing country seeking economic growth), the equity arguments against tax 
                                                 
65 The residence country would tax either the current profits of a domestic corporation with a permanent 
establishment in a low tax developing country or the dividends and interest received by a domestic parent 
of a foreign subsidiary operating in a low tax country.  Additionally, strong controlled foreign corporation 





competition can be understood as making claims based on both inter-individual equity 
and inter-nation equity, although the full theoretical underpinnings may not be adequately 
established.  For the developed sovereign state seeking to implement its desired vision of 
a modern social welfare state, tax competition curtails its ability to “appropriately” 
distribute the revenue burden among its population.  To the extent that the major 
multinationals and wealthy individual investors can rely on “havens”66 with attractive tax 
and regulatory structures to limit current taxation (through a combination of little or no 
local tax and a lack of transparency) their tax bills both abroad and at home will be 
reduced.67  Where the competition takes the form of lower rates on actual business 
activity (for example manufacturing) the loss arises because the business has located 
elsewhere, moving both jobs and current income from the reach of the parent’s residence 
jurisdiction.68  When and under what circumstances these competitive scenarios are 
definitively “bad” is one question,69 but another is how the complaining state suffers its 
harm.  From the residence country perspective, the argument is that the competition 
impedes its ability to fully achieve inter-individual equity, a generally accepted principle 
of domestic tax policy.70  The equity at stake is a domestic one.  The violation 
                                                 
66 As reviewed in Part II, the term tax competition is often used broadly to cover different situations such as 
havens relying on a combination of low/no taxes, secrecy, and paper functions, and “real” competition for 
true economic activity, typified by the competition over manufacturing investment.  These cases can be 
distinguished and can raise unique questions, particularly for the assessment of good and bad competition. 
67 The residence jurisdiction will either have no picture or an inaccurate picture of that global taxpayer.   
68 Although the question of whether foreign investment is always a substitute for domestic investment is 
contested, the experience of the past two decades has demonstrated a significant exodus of manufacturing, 
technology and information services operations from some developed countries to developing countries. 
See, e.g., Ashok D. Bardhan & Cynthia Kroll, The New Wave of Outsourcing,” Fisher Center for Real 
Estate and Urban Economics, U.C. Berkeley, Paper No. 1103 (2003) (discussing the loss of manufacturing 
jobs in the United States and comparing it to the prospects for service job loss).  Certainly these moves are 
not drive exclusively by taxes; wage costs have been a crucial factor in these decisions.  See, e.g., James R. 
Areddy, China’s Export Machine Threatened by Rising Costs – Orders Drops, Shops Idle in Sweater City; 
Losing Wal-Mart, Wall St. J. A1 (June 30, 2008)  (describing the manufacturing threat that China faces 
from low cost countries such as Vietnam).  The rise of corporation inversion transactions, where for 
example a U.S. multinational reorganizes its corporate structure so that the U.S. entities are only 
subsidiaries and the new parent corporation is a foreign corporation in a desirable jurisdiction, 
complements the picture of large multinationals placing business activities outside of developed 
jurisdictions like the United States.  Moving operations “offshore” provides little advantage if the parent 
jurisdiction can still reach that activity for income tax purposes.  For jurisdictions such as the United States 
with some real capacity to reach a portion of that income, the “logical” next step for corporate tax planning 
would be to take the United States out of the loop by transforming the U.S. multinational into a foreign 
multinational. 
69 See supra text accompanying note __, and infra Part III. 
70 Even where the contours of this inter-individual equity may be debated (see, for example, the continuing 




“committed” by the competing state is not a failure to achieve equity, but rather an 
interference with the residence state’s efforts to achieve equity in taxation.  The 
competing state has undermined the residence state’s “tax sovereignty,” broadly 
understood as the ability to effectively implement desired tax policy for its own 
taxpayers.71   
Although most nations readily assert and support the concept of tax sovereignty as 
a crucial power of the sovereign state, there is no clearly established scope or content for 
this sovereignty.72  Definitional ambiguity, however, is not the only problem for tax 
sovereignty.  Just as the residence states frame their inter-individual equity objections to 
tax competition in the language sovereignty, so too have the states engaging in 
competition.  In fact, they have generally been more successful in using sovereignty 
arguments to further their pro tax competition stance.  After the OECD issued its 1998 
report, and began pursuing the report’s recommendations, many targeted tax havens 
resisted.  Havens and other advocates of competition (or, more accurately, advocates of 
minimal taxation) painted the OECD and its member states as aggressively infringing 
upon the tax sovereignty of these “poor” (literally and figuratively) haven nations.73  The 
fact that some of this reaction was shaped and prodded by forces in the United States 
proves interesting on other grounds,74 but does not diminish the reality that the tax 
havens were able to generate what was perceived by many as a plausible, credible claim 
that tax sovereignty protected their “competitive” tax behavior.”75   
                                                                                                                                                 
inter-individual equity is presumed.  See, e.g., Paul McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical 
Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX. REV. 607 (1993); Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: 
Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 139 (1989); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, 
Once More, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 113 (1990). 
71 One question that arises is how much these problems are those of the residence state’s own making.  If 
the residence country instituted an entirely different tax regime, for example elimination of deferral, would 
that be a sufficient solution.  The answer depends in part of the nature of the competitive practice (e.g., 
secrecy cannot be countered by an expansion of the residence country’s current tax base); other competitive 
pressures (does it matter what other residence countries do); and resolution of the complex challenges of 
using corporations as proxies for their shareholders.  Interestingly, the much maligned OECD 1998 
recommendations called upon the residence jurisdictions to increase their use of anti-deferral regimes. 
72 See, e.g., Ring, supra note __ at 197-201 (examining the content of “tax sovereignty” in modern 
debates). 
73 See, e.g., Ring, supra note __ at 195-197. See also, supra note [30] reviewing the CFP’s role as official 
delegates on behalf of Antigua. 
74 See infra Part IV (discussing the lack of a monolithic position on tax competition within the various 
countries). 
75 For example, twenty six of the thirty eight members of the Congressional Black caucus signed a letter 




Ultimately, the tax competition debate could be understood as a battle of 
competing claims to tax sovereignty.  Essentially, the havens argue that they have the 
right to design their own tax and regulatory system in any way they deem beneficial to 
their state, even if a “side-effect” is reduced taxes collected by residence (generally 
developed) countries.  Any steps by the residence countries to try to limit the havens’ 
effectiveness is an infringement upon the havens’ tax sovereignty. Correspondingly, the 
residence countries (typified by the states supporting the OECD tax competition project) 
contend that they have the right (as a matter of tax sovereignty) to use their tax and 
regulatory system (and other rules) to implement a tax system (including one that seeks to 
limit tax competition) they deem beneficial to their state, even if it limits the 
attractiveness of havens and competing jurisdictions.  Although the tax competition 
problem was not immediately characterized as one of competing claims of tax 
sovereignty, the duality of tax sovereignty in the tax competition realm eventually 
emerged.76                                                                                                                                                             
How can these competing sovereignty claims be resolved?  What is the source of 
the alleged rights to such “tax sovereignty?”  At this point the states have moved beyond 
formal law in their appeal and have drawn upon the general expectations and 
understandings of the sovereign state world system.  Ultimately, the sovereignty of any 
one state is dependent upon the acceptance and recognition of that state by other states in 
the world.  In the modern sense, the system of sovereign states functions precisely 
because all of the players have a shared commitment to a basic structure and vision of 
                                                                                                                                                 
“will undermine the ability of developing nations . . . to strengthen and diversify their economies as well as 
reduce poverty,” (2) “threatens to undermine the fragile economies of some of our closest neighbors and 
allies, and (3) “will impose serious economic harm on developing nations.”  Letter from the Cong. Black 
Caucus to Paul O’Neill, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, (Mar. 14, 2001) available at http://www. 
freedomandprosperity.org/publications/publications.shtml.  See also, Kimberly Carlson, When Cows have 
Wings: An Analysis of the OECD’s Tax Haven Work As It Relates to Globalization, Sovereignty and 
Privacy, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 163, 172  (2002) (“The OECD scheme would encourage the world’s 
major economies to penalize 41 low-tax countries and territories for maintaining attractively low rates 
unless they essentially relinquish their fiscal sovereignty.” Quoting Deroy Murdock, Attack of the Global 
Tax Police, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Apr. 23, 2001, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/murdock/murdock042301.shtml). 
76 See Michael Littlewood, Tax Competition: Harmful to Whom?, 26 Mich. J. Int’l L. 411, 480 (2004) (“if 
the tax havens are free to structure their tax systems so as to facilitate the avoidance of other countries’ 
taxes, it seems to follow that the other countries should be free to structure their tax system so as to 
discourage the use of havens [e.g. by disallowing deductions to haven entities, levying withholding taxes 




international order and international relations.77  Despite the existence of some basic 
structure, there is not agreement on the exact nature of certain dimensions of sovereignty 
– such as the tax sovereignty claimed in the tax competition context.  Neither the 
literature nor the theory of the sovereign state political system provides an answer.   
On the most fundamental level, regardless of how egregious some states find the 
behavior of other states in the realm of tax competition, the conduct does not arise to the 
level of clear violation of state sovereignty in the way that physical invasion of a state’s 
territorial borders would.  Although the analysis and literature currently contemplating 
these competing claims fails to offer a clear resolution,78 some of the arguments on 
behalf of the havens foreshadow arguments they may hope will break the deadlock:  the 
actions of the OECD and its member states are “bad” because they constitute the efforts 
of a powerful state (or group of states) to restrict the options and opportunities of a poor 
and developing nation.   
The norm implicated here by the havens is not just respect for sovereignty, 
because that has proven insufficient, but respect by the powerful states for the needs of 
the weaker states.  Although there may be many reasons that global society would decide 
that some preference or advantage should be accorded poorer nations, sovereignty per se 
has not been traditionally understood to require this.  As noted in Part I,79 an international 
system based on sovereign states does not anticipate or require equality of power, wealth, 
or outcome for individual sovereign states.  It is not inconsistent with the theory of the 
sovereign state system for one state to leverage its power and resources to influence the 
actions of another sovereign and thereby secure an advantage to itself.   
One critic of the OECD and its tax competition project attempts to distinguish 
general power plays by nations (permissible) from the specific anti-tax competition 
activities of the OECD and its members over tax competition (characterized as 
                                                 
77 The existence of the basic shared understanding that underlies the system does not eliminate 
disagreements.  For example, the status of Taiwan remains uncertain.  In contrast, where all the relevant 
parties “agree” then de jure independence can be established – essentially in a moment.  For example, the 
former British colony the Ellice Islands became independent and sovereign (with British assent) at 
midnight on September 30, 1978 under the new name Tuvalu.  Alan James, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD (1986) 
at 23.   Thus, Tuvalu made the shift to sovereign status at a specified moment in time by virtue of the 
collective acceptance by the global community of this change. 
78 Ring, supra note ___ at 179-80, 200-201 (discussing that lack of a clear theoretical solution to the 
problem of competing claims of tax sovereignty). 




impermissible):  “Any sovereignty that is lost by signing a worldwide trade agreement . . 
. is tolerable because it is only forfeited after an opportunity to negotiate.  By excluding 
non-OECD members in the analysis and by recommending coordinated defensive 
measures, the OECD violates the sovereignty of those nations that it unilaterally deems 
tax havens.”80  According to this vision of sovereignty, the problem is not that the haven 
nations got a bad deal from the OECD members, but rather that they got this bad deal 
without having a chance to negotiate for a better one. Although this argument implicitly 
accepts that sovereignty can “legitimately” sustain unequal effects, it still ascribes to 
sovereigns more “rights” than are traditionally acknowledged.  Certainly the negotiation 
of a bad (or perhaps more accurately, uneven) deal is a legitimate act of sovereign states.  
However, the opportunity to negotiate before another state takes domestic regulatory 
steps (e.g. tax, banking, foreign aid) is not traditionally understood as an inherent right of 
a sovereign.  Moreover, this argument cannot really resolve the impasse created by the 
competing claims of tax sovereignty because the OECD member states could likely 
counter that they were not granted a chance to negotiate with the havens before the 
havens implemented their regimes. 
This point returns us to one thread of the anti-OECD critique that could tip the 
balance: the idea that the strength of competing sovereignty claims can differ depending 
on the wealth and power of the countries involved.81  The idea that the havens’ claim to 
tax sovereignty in designing their system should be superior to a counterclaim by the 
OECD members precisely because they are poorer, less powerful nations is essentially an 
argument for inter-nation equity – the idea that there is some type of fairness calculus on 
the global state-to-state scale taking account of the difference in situation among states.  
Often inter-nation equity is envisioned loosely as an analog to inter-individual equity.  
However, as the literature on that question has recognized, the parallels are not 
complete.82  The principles and premises of inter-individual equity (generated as a 
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81 See Ring, supra note __ at 179-80, 200-201. 
82 See, e.g., Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L 
BUS. 145, 153-54, 188-89 (1998). Kim Brooks,  Inter-nation Equity: The Development of an Important but 
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guiding principal of the relationship among members of a political community) cannot be 
immediately transported to the inter-nation context.83  At present, firm foundations for a 
generally accepted vision of inter-nation equity have yet to be established although a 
number of scholars are working actively in this area.  Until we can generate such a vision, 
the competing claims of tax sovereignty must be resolved on other grounds. 
Thus, what started out as an objection to haven tax competition because it 
impeded the residence state’s ability to implement a tax system consistent with domestic 
inter-individual equity became a conflict over competing claims for tax sovereignty 
which looks to an as yet unspecified idea of inter-nation equity as a possible resolution.84  
Yet, inter-nation equity was the basis of the other set of normative equity-based 
arguments against tax competition: the case of the developing country seeking active 
business investment. 
  2. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ RACE TO THE BOTTOM – A CALL FOR 
INTER-NATION EQUITY 
Another dimension to the tax competition problem highlighted above in Part II.A. 
reflected on the plight of developing countries seeking revenue and investment in their 
effort to enhance the condition of their economy and social welfare.  One way of 
characterizing the argument on behalf of these havens against competition, is that 
continued unrestrained competition is a negative race to the bottom where they lose vital 
revenue, de facto secure no real additional business investment,85 and the “advantage” of 
the competition goes to the multinationals and their home counties.86  These developing 
                                                                                                                                                 
Equity, in MODERN FISCAL ISSUES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CARL S. SHOUP, (Richard M. Bird & John G. 
Head, eds., 1972). 
83 See infra text accompanying notes 92-93. See also Brooks, supra note 80; Ilan Benshalom, The New 
Poor at Our Gates: Global Justice Implications for International Trade and Tax Law (December 19, 2008) 
Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 08-43. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319465. 
84 Although even if we established a clear interest in inter-nation equity, it would still need to be considered 
against the modern welfare state’s desire to achieve inter-individual equity for a wide group of people. 
85 As to whether the countries engaging in the “forced” competition do benefit and obtain valuable 
investment – the question has both a short-term and long-term dimension.  Short-term – is the state accurate 
in calculating the loss of revenue and the benefit of business and investment secured by competition?  If the 
state inaccurately concluded competition was needed, the state could improve its fiscal position 
immediately by ending its competitive features.  If the state is “correct” that current competition is crucial 
to maintaining its place in the business and investment world (but is leading to zero revenue with no 
significant efficiency gains – i.e. the race to the bottom), then the solution is longer –term and multiparty. 
86 “Trends in global inequality depend on changes in inequality between and within countries. Inequality 




countries gain little ground in the fight against poverty and its related ills, and the gap 
between wealthy and poor states in the global economy widens.  According to this 
critique, such tax competition must be reconsidered in order to promote and support 
“inter-nation equity”.  In this context, the idea of inter-nation equity connotes “more 
equitable distribution” of the tax pie, but again relies on a concept that has visceral appeal 
(inter-nation equity) yet unclear foundations.87  Tax competition is not the only context in 
which this type of inter-nation equity argument has been proffered.  Bilateral double tax 
treaties face scrutiny as inappropriately favoring capital exporting nations through their 
allocation of primary and residual taxing rights.  Developing countries reportedly have 
made “concessions” in tax treaties without a full awareness of their implications because 
they believed the provisions were standard and because the provisions were formally 
reciprocal (enhancing their appearance of mutuality and comparable impact).88  
  a. Normative basis for inter-nation equity  
In both the treaty and tax competition context, the inter-nation equity argument 
captures the belief that the developing nations currently secure an inadequate and unfair 
share of the global tax revenue pie.  This idea, that international practices disfavoring 
poorer states might be labeled unfair and warrant re-evaluation to address inter-nation 
equity, seems plausible.  But once again, we are faced with the question – what forms the 
normative basis for this inter-nation equity?  One version of this inter-nation equity claim 
emerges from the broader inquiry of philosophy and political science into concerns for 
global justice.  Globalization has prompted a reconsideration of ideas of distributive 
                                                                                                                                                 
richest and the poorest countries has progressively widened (for example, doubling between the top 20 and 
bottom 20 countries over the past 40 years -- figure 2) as a significant number of countries are falling 
further behind compared not only to industrial countries but to other developing countries.  The income 
distribution between countries has consequently worsened (figure 3). At the same time, there has been an 
acceleration in growth in many developing countries, including the most populous ones, so that the gap 
between their average incomes and that of industrial countries has begun to narrow. Overall, inter-country 
inequality weighted by population has decreased as a result (figure 3). China and India account for the bulk 
of this improvement. While inter-country inequality has improved, inequality within many of the most 
populous countries, with a large number of poor, has increased modestly.”  WORLD BANK, POVERTY IN AN 
AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 4 (2000).  See also, Avi-Yonah, supra note __. 
 
87 See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 80; Benshalom, supra note 81. 
88 The reciprocity was more apparent than real because the difference in economic situation of the two 
states meant that in practice, applications of the reciprocal provisions would not offset.  See generally, 
Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. OF INT’L L. & POLITICS 939 (2000); Allison Christians, 





justice and its traditional focus (almost exclusively) on the “domestic sphere.”89  Among 
the questions raised are a number that might sound familiar to the tax world, including: 
“Should we recognize a basic right to subsistence or to a basic income?”  “How should 
we distribute or redistribute natural resources or social primary goods?”  and “What are 
the limits of state sovereignty?”90
The answers are unclear because there is no “universal” agreement on obligations 
(at least above some “basic” human rights minimum) owed to others globally.91  
However, the challenge to tax competition sounding in inter-nation equity and global 
resource allocation relies on some version of moral and political theory in which our 
obligations extend beyond national borders.  A likely candidate for this theoretical 
support lies in the broad umbrella of cosmopolitan theories of the justice.  Quite 
generally, cosmopolitanism is a “moral perspective that emphasizes the unity of humanity 
as a single moral community of equally valuable individuals . . . . [where] justice requires 
each person, regardless of citizenship or nationality, to be treated as an equal for the 
purposes of determining the claims and duties of distributive justice.”92  As an umbrella 
concept, cosmopolitanism has a range of variants.  The strong version contends that a 
special concern for an individual is justified only if it is good for humanity as a whole.93  
The moderate version acknowledges that although we have duties to all other persons, we 
might have special duties to a subset (such as fellow members of our nation-state) which 
are not justified on the grounds of benefiting humanity as a whole.94  Cosmopolitanism’s 
focus on the individual, when directed at international taxation, prompts the question - 
why should a group of individuals have a smaller piece of the revenue pie by virtue of 
their residence in a historically weak and impoverished state?  Inter-nation equity 
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90Tinnevelt & Verschraegen, supra note __ at  2; see also  Charles Jones, Global Distributive Justice, in 
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(2002), Thomas Pogge, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2002). 
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demands attention not because nations, per se, have these rights, but because the nation 
stands as the representative of a large group of individuals.  When the nation’s share is 
not equitable, what we are really saying is that the population’s share is not equitable and 
is “artificially” based on the division of the world into nation-states.   
Of course this picture of cosmopolitan justice drastically understates the 
complexities, nuances and disagreements of the multiple theoretical paths.  Much 
attention can be and is devoted to examining the implications, variations, limitations, and 
potential extensions of the rich universe of cosmopolitan thought.  However, two 
important points can be made.   
  i. Link between inter-nation equity and inter-individual equity 
First, as noted above, the cosmopolitan ideal and its pursuit of global justice, 
including distributive justice, has not yet generated a widely accepted vision of the 
contours of our global commitment to individuals and of the appropriate standard for 
allocating resources and evaluating distributive justice.  When and why does an 
allocation of resources that would be unacceptable domestically become acceptable 
globally?  In some sense, the inquiry of cosmopolitanism and global justice links inter-
individual equity and inter-nation equity by essentially forcing us to answer the 
questions, “Why do inter-individual equity obligations and goals end at the national 
border?” and “Why isn’t inter-nation equity really the same as inter-individual equity?”  
Extensively developed answers to these questions are grounded in the relationship of 
government, society, law and the individual.95  Our relationship to other members of our 
own nation-state is different according to these measures, from our relationship to 
members of other countries.   
Recognizing the interaction between arguments for inter-nation equity and those 
for inter-individual equity helps identify the sovereignty-based constraints under which 
they operate and the current limitations on their ability to provide a clear and widely 
accepted foundation for certain kinds of global justice.  Inter-individual equity96 issues 
arise within the nation-state and are consistent with the concepts and expectations in a 
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democratic sovereign state regarding the relationship between the government and the 
people.97  Inter-nation equity, with its demand that equity and distributive justice not be 
limited by national borders, struggles under cosmopolitanism theory to find its 
grounding.  One “obvious” solution is to characterize inter-nation equity as inter-
individual equity (because it is the individuals for whom we are ultimately concerned).  
However, to fit inter-nation equity into the current framework of inter-individual equity 
(premised on a legitimate nation-state and community) we can only endorse the “inter-
nation version” of inter-individual equity if in fact all of these individuals are members of 
a single community under one government – a global state.98  That is, if we had a single 
global state then in theory the arguments that bind us on inter-individual equity grounds 
to our fellow citizens would now bind us to all humanity.  Without an accepted and fully 
developed theory of duty and obligation for “others,” inter-nation equity collapses itself, 
both theoretically and literally, into inter-individual equity.  Of course, if that were to 
happen (the creation of a world state) we would no longer be discussing inter-nation 
equity.   
But could it happen? Certainly, as a practical matter, a single global state is 
unlikely to appear any time soon.  Moreover, as the author has explored elsewhere, the 
move to a global state is not just practically implausible, but also theoretically distinct 
from a world with a multiplicity of sovereigns.  A stable, legitimate government with the 
capacity to enforce sanctions requires a certain connection among the people.  According 
to this view, “democratic legitimacy is possible only within the framework of a demos—
that is, a political community expressed in the concept of a nation.  Beyond the nation-
state, there is no strong sense of public interest, and the potential for political regulation 
is limited.”99  Nothing formally limits the demos to the level of the nation-state, but as 
yet no real demos has emerged beyond that level.  Even in the European Union, with its 
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98 Some theorists affirmatively maintain that global justice obligations as envisioned by the cosmopolitan 
theorists are not possible absent a world government because “justice is necessarily connected to 
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unique set of commitments among sovereign states, political discourse and commitment 
remains predominantly national.100  Thus, the prospect for grounding inter-nation equity 
in inter-individual equity is unrealistic and essentially eliminates the distinction between 
the two. 
What about inter-nation equity standing alone?  Why do we have such difficulty 
establishing the normative framework for this position?  As noted, above, there has been 
extensive work done demonstrating why the justifications and rationales supporting inter-
individual equity cannot be directly translated to inter-nation equity.  This work focuses 
in part on the grounding of inter-individual equity in the political theory of the nation-
state.101  The political theory supporting the nation state structure (including concepts of 
justice, power, legitimacy, and the need for a people with a shared political commitment 
– a demos) would clash with cosmopolitanism’s premise that there should be no 
distinction among individuals despite their membership in another sovereign state.102    
But what if we could imagine a theoretical foundation for inter-nation equity, 
would that be enough?  Probably not.  The practical barrier that the current sovereign 
state system poses to the international redistribution required under a cosmopolitan ideal 
is starkly illustrated by hypotheticals offered by Ilan Benshalom.103  Cosmopolitan ideals 
of justice would dictate transfers from wealthy states and their peoples to poor states, 
without regard to the political identity of the recipient.  Thus, Japan could be asked to 
redistribute to North Korea, and Israel to Syria, irrespective of the political and military 
tensions between the states.104  Sadly, in a world of substantial political and military 
conflict, many other compelling examples can be drawn from 20th century history to the 
present.  Even if the underlying cosmopolitan theory were morally sound and internally 
developed, the practical outcome would be a political non-starter at present.   
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Ultimately, the sovereign state system requires that claims for inter-nation equity 
either find a compatible interpretation within the sovereign system or argue persuasively 
and plausible for its replacement.105  Thus, arguments against tax competition based on 
inter-nation equity face a significant hurdle from the sovereign state system. 
    ii. Revisiting the Classic Sovereign State 
The second observation we can make with respect to inter-nation equity, 
sovereignty, and challenges to tax competition is that history shows us the flexibility of 
the sovereign nation concept.  The stereotyped concept of a sovereign state as 
independent from all external forces and in complete control domestically, has been a 
fiction,106 and certainly is not theoretically required today.  The “compromises” of the 
20th century to the ideal image of the sovereign state include acknowledgment of human 
rights claims and the recognition of the illegitimacy of imperial rule.  Perhaps we can find 
room for a moderate variant of cosmopolitan theory which grants a special, and possibly 
dominant, obligation to fellow citizens but maintains a heightened set of duties to all 
persons.  One question arises: if there are global duties does that imply the need for 
global institutions (even if not necessarily a world state)?  Once again, if the currently 
incomplete cosmopolitan theories could develop a framework for the stable world order 
that would implement their vision of global justice,107 the sovereign state system might 
be flexible enough to accommodate it.108
  b.  Realistic Application of Inter-nation Equity Claims 
But until cosmopolitan theories answer these calls for a more specified vision of 
the required economic justice and of its stable implementation in the world, where are 
we?  Are inter-nation equity challenges to tax competition without support?  Although 
the strong moral claim potentially promised by cosmopolitan theory may emerge in the 
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future, there are three ways in which states can press an inter-nation equity claim in the 
modern sovereign state world.  First, policy makers can make appeals on humanitarian 
grounds that essentially correspond to what the literature refers to as “charity,” in contrast 
to moral obligations.109  Such calls are weaker than a statement of moral obligation, and 
according to Nagel do not constitute true global justice,110 yet they may yield some 
results, particularly in combination with the two additional points below.  To the extent 
that we believe it is possible to shift and shape norms and behavior without a full scale 
rethinking of foundational philosophical theory, developing countries might benefit from 
efforts to promote a charitable norm of this type. 
Second, and likely related to the first, it may be possible to expand upon some of 
the accepted thinking on human rights to encompass more clearly defined economic 
rights.  Some scholars are currently pursuing this line of reasoning,111 considering 
whether support for human rights can make sense without a corresponding commitment 
to certain economic baselines for the society.  If the latter can be established, or at least 
argued, then ensuring adequate tax revenue to those developing nations which are the 
locus of significant human rights concerns (in terms of standard of living and related 
measures) could constitute a necessary component of a national commitment to human 
rights globally. 
Third, it may be possible to make arguments against tax competition (influenced 
by inter-nation equity) that appeal to the core of state sovereignty – the call to national 
self interest.  Assuming a competing state inaccurately views its competitive behavior as 
beneficial, then if that state were convinced its calculation was in error it might change its 
tax rules and eliminate the competitive component in an act of self interest. However, 
given the difficulty in making these determinations in many cases, and given the 
pressures on governments to appear active in trying to attract business, this effort at 
persuasion on the facts is unlikely to be successful.  But another push at self interest 
remains, this time on the developed country side.  To the extent one can make plausible 
arguments that the current distribution of global tax revenues among states is not merely 
inadequate for developing countries, but also inevitably undesirable for developed 
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countries (perhaps due to decreased political stability in developing countries, or due to a 
stagnant consumer market in those countries), then challenges to tax competition and the 
race to the bottom could be re-cast in a manner entirely consistent with the operation of a 
sovereign state world system. 
Thus, given that cosmopolitan theories of justice have not yet unseated the 
sovereign state system, either as a theoretical or practical matter, their moral claims for 
inter-nation equity as its relates to tax competition will have limited force.  Advocates for 
developing countries must therefore look to charity arguments, to national self-interest, 
and to an expanded and clarified conception of human rights (with a detailed economic 
component) to achieve their desired fiscal changes.  
 
IV. STRATEGIC USE OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE MISSION TO SECURE 
COOPERATION OVER TAX COMPETITION 
If a sovereign state system remains the framework against which the battle over 
tax competition rages, can features of the sovereign state system be co-opted by those 
aiming to curb harmful tax competition?  Rather than serving as a reminder of our current 
absence of a complete, viable theoretical framework of global justice that would demand 
increased attention to equity, can the sovereign state become part of the solution?  This 
section explores a range of connected strategies that might be available in different 
circumstances and in different combinations. 
 A. RESURGENT SOVEREIGNTY CLAIM 
The first possibility is a return to tax sovereignty – the very place we left with an 
impasse.  Is it possible to characterize a subset of tax competition practices –those that 
really constitute tax evasion--112 as cases in which it is not “merely” the general tax 
sovereignty of the state that is at risk but instead the more fundamental obligations of 
accountability to its people?  Consider Country X, with a number of resident 
multinational corporations and wealthy individuals who have invested in havens in an 
effort to hide and avoid otherwise due Country X tax.  If Country X cannot guarantee to 
its population that it is acting with reasonably full and complete knowledge in imposing 
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tax burdens and enforcing tax rules,113 (i.e. that its tax bills and enforcement actions 
adequately reflect the realty of its own taxpayers’ haven investments) and if the people 
cannot verify those decisions, is a vital component of a legitimate democracy – 
accountability – missing?  To the extent that this line of reasoning can successfully 
refocus the competing sovereignty claims, it could provide support in a subset of cases. 
In addition to framing the revitalized sovereignty argument as a question of 
accountability, it might be useful to return to the core definition of a sovereign state.  
Recall that despite some variation in the definition, the core accepted components of a 
sovereign state included control over territory and people.  The state challenging tax 
competition should anchor its objections in the very definition of sovereignty purportedly 
cherished by the competing state.  If sovereignty presumes that states exert control over 
their own people, then tax practices that facilitate the avoidance of domestic country 
taxes would be an attack on the core sovereignty of that residence country, arguably no 
different than physically invading its territory (the other feature over which the sovereign 
state is expected to exhibit control). 
Finally, where examples of tax competition depend significantly on the host 
jurisdiction’s commitment to secrecy, nondisclosure and little or no information sharing 
with the residence country, then the tax sovereignty claims of the developed (residence) 
country) might be better paired with a broader challenge to these competition behaviors 
based on their ability to facilitate terrorism, money laundering, and other “non-tax” 
problems.  In recent years, the tenor of the debate over issues of secrecy, disclosure and 
information sharing outside the tax realm has shifted significantly.  The tax competition 
debate though has exhibited less influence from these major events.  However, reframing 
the tax issues as part of, not simply analogous to, the broader financial concerns may 
prove powerful. 
 B. SOVEREIGNS AND THE “RIGHT” TO USE POWER, LEVERAGE AND DEAL 
MAKING 
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 Sovereignty ideals validate one state’s use of its influence and power to exact 
agreements and concessions from another state.  To the extent, for example, that the 
OECD members sought to use their “power” (including economic advantages) to obtain 
the consent of havens to the OECD plan to eliminate harmful tax competition, 
sovereignty is not inherently violated.  It seems that the OECD did initially take a route 
more aptly characterized as a power move than an invitation to negotiate when it issued 
the 1998 Report.  OECD success though would depend on the true power behind the 
asserted positions.  It is unclear what trajectory the 1998 report and its recommendations 
would have taken in subsequent years had the United States remained fully invested in 
the project.114  However, without the United States on board, and given the other 
fractures, sufficient power did not exist as of 2001. 
 At that stage, the strategy of sovereign deal making and negotiation moved to the 
fore.  Consideration of this shift draws our attention to the running debate in international 
relations theory as to whether the neorealists or the neoliberals more accurately describe 
the nature of inter-state cooperation and regime formation.  Does power shape the 
international world, or do the agreements that we see and the regimes that are formed 
reflect the market nature of interactions and the ever-present desire to produce a more 
efficient outcome?115  The tax competition controversy does not answer that century old 
debate, but it provides additional fodder for the theorists.  More importantly, however, if 
a deal on tax competition can make all of the states better off, then cooperation is 
certainly possible.  But as noted earlier, even if certain competitive practices are globally 
inefficient, simply eliminating those practices may not improve all states’ positions.  
States achieving an advantage from competition become losers by cooperating unless 
redistribution (the sharing of the global gain) takes place.  Although we lack a fully 
viable theory of global justice that would require redistribution globally, we do not need 
such an equity theory to justify redistribution undertaken as part of a trade.  Exactly how 
this deal would take shape would depend on the machinations of the extensive game 
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theory and modeling that occupies much of the international relations and international 
regime formation literature.116  Three immediate versions can be identified: 
(1) Share the gain – If eliminating certain harmful tax practices generates a net 
gain for the OECD countries then they can offer to share that gain.  This 
sharing could be done directly, as suggested by Steven Dean, by paying 
havens when they facilitate the identification of income and taxpayers who are 
avoiding home country taxation.117  Such a plan is not without obstacles 
including the need to limit negative incentives of states to implement regimes 
so as to collect the finder’s fee.  This sharing could also be done indirectly by 
modifying certain features of the residence country’s tax system or treaty 
provisions to expand the source country’s opportunity to engage in 
“legitimate” revenue collection. 
(2) Bundle strategy – If providing a related tax carrot proves too cumbersome or 
risky, an agreement on tax competition could be bundled with other issues or 
benefits not related to taxation (including trade, military, development aid).118   
(3) Combine deal making with power—The sophisticated understanding of the 
neoliberal views on cooperation and regime formation in the international 
arena recognizes that power is not irrelevant, but rather that cooperation 
develops where there are inefficiencies that can be improved upon through the 
deal.  However, more than one deal may be possible and the ultimate selection 
among those choices may turn substantially on relative power among the 
states.119  For example, in a gain sharing solution, although the allocation to 
the competing states must be sufficient to garner their support (i.e. make them 
better off than competing), the developed countries might be able to achieve 
this while still retaining a larger portion of the total tax pie. 
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C.  SEEING BEYOND THE SOVEREIGNTY 
Just because the global system operates with sovereign states as dominant players 
and just because the states set tax policy and collect and use the resulting revenue, it is 
critical never to lose sight of the fact that sovereignty is about the international 
relationships among states.  In that setting, states act as a monolith and must present a 
single view and speak with one voice.  Either the country will or will not sign the treaty; 
either it will or will not impose withholding taxes.  Only one official, national position 
can operate at a single moment in time (assuming the government has functional control).  
 The state, however, is not a monolith of views.  If we open the lid of the nation 
and look inside we find multiple, competing, and contradictory views on all of the 
important international issues.  The democratic political process within the state sorts 
through these competing positions and arrives at a single view that it then advocates on 
behalf of the state.  Although that process may validate the selection of one view among 
many, it does not negate the reality that there were many voices and that a different voice 
may rise to the top at a later date.  Within tax competition we saw this most dramatically 
in the evolution of the official U.S. position on the OECD project during the period 
January 2001- May 2001 as the Bush administration came into office.  In this case the 
reality that states are not a monolith worked against the OECD harmful tax practices 
agenda, however, the same observations can be used affirmatively to push for 
cooperation (perhaps in conjunction with some of the approaches outlined in Part IV.B. 
above).  If the OECD members are not monoliths, then neither are the havens.  The 
challenge is determining where a useful and reasonable fissure on the tax competition 
issue lies.   
One possibility is a case described in Part II, of a haven that may have 
miscalculated in deciding that competition was beneficial.  If there was a miscalculation, 
the haven’s administration may resist revisiting the issue and admitting error, but perhaps 
other segments of the population or business sector could be persuaded that a shift would 
be in their own and their national interests.  Another possibility is a country in which the 
benefits of competition are not widely disbursed and are concentrated at the top.  In this 
case, it could be strategic to identify the ways in which the competition serves a small 




For example, a “paper” haven in which the foreign investors have minimal presence and 
investment in the country does generate business for locals who facilitate that paper 
existence but may provide little income or investment for the state more broadly. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Sovereignty permeates the tax competition controversy—both in the 
characterization of the problem and the crafting of cooperative solutions.  It helps explain 
the limits of efficiency and equity arguments against harmful tax competition.  Market 
failure ideas, which generally support intervention and regulation, adapt less readily to an 
inter-state market which lacks the requisite supra-state above the individual nation-states.  
Similarly, the complex equity arguments are inextricably intertwined with both the 
practical constraints of a sovereign state system and the theoretical values embodied in 
the modern democratic sovereign state.  Certain challenges to tax competition (appeals to 
charity, self-interest, and human rights) remain available despite the absence of a 
sustainable vision of global economic justice and redistribution with which to critique 
specific competition practices.  Moreover, armed with a heightened appreciation for the 
place of sovereignty in tax competition we can reconsider possible sovereignty based 
arguments, engage in deal-making, and capitalize on the distinction between sovereign 
states and monoliths.  Finally, although a frank and honest conversation about what we 
value through sovereignty and what we aspire to globally will not provide ready answers 
to long-standing dilemmas of philosophy and political reality, it will sharpen our focus 
and attention on the underlying issues of global justice and global governance in a 
dialogue linking philosophy, law, political science, and economics.   
 41
